Vicente Valentim’s The Normalization of the Radical Right: A Norms Theory of Political Supply and Demand is certainly one of the most important political science books of the season. Like many authors before him, Valentim addresses the question of how the rise of far-right parties can be explained. His approach is centered around the concepts of norms and normalization.
He plausibly argues that the rise of the far right cannot be explained by an increase in far-right attitudes or preferences among the population. The available polling data suggests that the level of these attitudes/preferences is largely stable – and the change of a variable cannot be explained with a constant.
Instead, Valentim suggests that one should look at social norms which he mostly identifies with social desirability and perceived social pressure.[1] Here is a condensed version of his argument: By and large, people for decades had the very same nationalist, nativist etc. attitudes they have today. But they did not act on them in the public sphere or the voting booth because they knew or assumed that this would have been a violation of social norms. In recent years, however, these norms ceased to be effective and now many people with far-right attitudes/preferences vote for far-right parties – and no longer hesitate to say publicly that they do so.
This is a compelling case which Valentim backs with survey data.
However, I see one problem: Valentim does not systematically distinguish the normalization of far-right parties from the normalization of far-right ideology. He convincingly demonstrates that far-right parties have been normalized, and he repeatedly implies that the same is true for far-right ideology – but he does not demonstrate the latter.
It is plausible to assume that both kinds of normalization can go together just fine: Far-right parties promote far-right ideologies such as nativism, nationalism, sexism, homophobia etc. If it were true that the utterance of far-right ideologies was once suppressed by social norms but no longer is, this would clearly favor the normalization of far-right parties.
However, one can also have one without the other. Here is one alternative case: The public utterance of ideologies such as nativism, nationalism, sexism, homophobia etc. used to be socially permissible long before the normalization of far-right parties – at least to a certain degree. Hence, such utterances were a constant part of social reality. In the political sphere, conservative parties were the most likely actors to promote these ideologies. But then, thanks to successes of feminist and anti-racist movements and a more general liberalization, social norms regarding these ideologies became more restrictive, the ideologies were denormalized and even conservative parties grew more hesitant to promote them publicly. Hence, those among the electorate who hold such views and consider them important “lost” their representation and were looking for a new one which they found in far-right parties. In such a course of events, far-right parties could be normalized while far-right ideology would be as normal as it was before (with a brief period of denormalization in-between). This is roughly the backlash hypothesis.
One could also make compelling arguments for other alternative models in which far-right parties are normalized without far-right ideology being normalized – for example with models focused on salience (which Valentim discards a bit too quickly).
I am not claiming that the ideological normalization hypothesis is wrong and the backlash hypothesis is correct. I am only stating that one cannot assume that the normalization of parties implies the normalization of ideology.
The German case which Valentim discusses in Chapter 8 of his book is a good case in point. Valentim quotes infamous remarks from AfD politicians Björn Höcke and Alexander Gauland as evidence of the AfD’s attempts to normalize far right ideology.
‘Gauland argued that Germans should be proud of what their soldiers had done during World War II. Gauland also argued that German identity no longer needed to be tied up with what had happened between 1933 and 1945. He went on to argue that it was time for the country to “claim its past back”. In another example, Björn Höcke, the leader of the AfD in Thuringia, called the Berlin Holocaust memorial a monument of shame. He further argued that the country needed “a 180-degree turn” in how it remembered its history and how it sought to make up for it’
These remarks were clearly violations of discursive norms – as is evident in the reactions to them. However, there is no compelling evidence that these discursive norms were changed and the statements normalized. Attempts to reclaim German history as something positive have been common for most of German post-war history. The defense of the Wehrmacht as an honorable military force was mostly a project of the right – very much including the conservative right. The last big discursive battles over this issue were fought around the turn of the century in the context of an exhibition portraying the crimes of the Wehrmacht. When it comes to Höcke’s speech it is remarkable how eerily similar it is to the remarks renowned novelist Martin Walser made in his acceptance speech for one of the most prestigious literary awards in Germany two decades earlier. Walser’s speech was also a scandal. But back then the scandal was triggered when these statements were made at the very center of German high culture, twenty years later the scandal was triggered when they were made by a representative of the extremist current within a far-right party. This is hardly evidence of their normalization – if anything, of the contrary.
Another example Valentim discusses is that of Martin Hohmann. Hohmann was ousted from the conservative CDU in the early 2000s after he gave a speech speculating on whether or not Germans or Jews should be considered a “people of perpetrators”/“Tätervolk”. After a decade of abstinence from national politics he joined the AfD after its rise and normalization. Valentim interpretes this as evidence of the normalization of the far right.
‘Indeed, at a time when radical-right parties were unsuccessful and consistently failed to enter national parliaments, Hohmann joined the center-right CDU—not one of the small radical-right parties that existed in Germany at the time. However, he had a number of clearly radical-right views, as shown by his anti-Semitic speech and his subsequent refusal to retract it. These views were clearly at odds with the ideology of the CDU, which is why Hohmann ended up being expelled. And yet the CDU was still the party Hohmann had joined and made a career in. I have argued that this situation should change after skilled political entrepreneurs enter politics with a radical-right platform. Once they do, and become electorally successful, other politicians are likely to perceive the radical right as more electorally viable. The Hohmann case also illustrates this point. Hohmann did not initially join one of the small radical-right parties that existed in Germany. In 2016, however—over a decade after his expulsion—he changed this decision, and joined the increasingly successful—and, by then, clearly radical-right—challenger: the AfD’ (p. 221-222).
But once again, there is a different case to be made: When Hohmann joined the CDU, he could plausibly believe that the party stood for the same “radical-right views” that he held. The CDU in the state of Hesse had a relevant right-wing current for decades – and it was particularly strong in Eastern Hesse which is home to Hohmann. One of the most infamous representatives of this current was Alfred Dregger. This long-time leader of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag routinely made comments about migration or German history that are quite close to positions which are today only be found in the AfD. It was only after the liberalization of the CDU in the 21st century that Hohmann’s views were “clearly at odds with the ideology of the CDU”. (Although, the “people of perpetrators”/“Tätervolk”-speech might have been scandalous before that.)
This does not mean that the AfD is a mere reincarnation of the old CDU. It is not. The AfD is a party dominated by far-right and even right-wing extremist actors which the CDU never was. But it does suggest that many of the ideological positions which the AfD promotes today have been “normal” for much of German post-war history.
Of course, one cannot generalize from these examples. I would assume that three kinds of differentiations will be necessary. First is a differentiation by country. The normalization-of-ideology hypothesis is much more plausible in countries with a strong liberal tradition concerning immigration such as the Netherlands and Denmark. It is much less plausible for countries in which ethnic nationalism has much deeper roots such as Germany. Second is a differentiation by subject area. The hypothesis that hatred against refugees has been normalized is much more plausible than the hypothesis that homophobia has been normalized. Third is a differentiation by period. If we compare today with 2010, the hypothesis of a normalization of ideology is much more plausible than it is if we compare today with the 1980s (at least for the German case).
But all these questions can only be answered by discourse-historical work.
[1] I have social theoretical doubts about this conception of norms, but this is not important here.